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Abstract
The sudden disruption of work, recreation and leisure practices caused by the COVID-19 lockdown caught many 
organisations and their employees unaware, especially during the move towards working from home. This led 
adaptive cybercriminals to shift their own focus towards home workers as a way into organisational networks. The 
upshot was a massive acceleration in major cyberattacks upon organisations and a noticeable shift in offender 
tactics which scale up levels of fear in victims to encourage payment of the ransom. Such tactics include a shift 
towards naming and shaming victims, the theft of commercially sensitive data and attacks targeting organisations 
which provide services to other organisations. These developments have also led to changes in the organisation 
of offenders online. Such attacks negatively impact upon national and international economies as they try to 
recover from lockdown. Drawing upon an analysis of 4000+ cases of ransomware attacks collected for the EPSRC 
EMPHASIS & CRITICAL research projects, this paper charts the evolution of ransomware as a modern cybercrime 
and also changes in the organisation of cyber-criminals as well as highlighting some of the implications for trans-
national policing.
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Introduction1
The 2020 COVID-19 lockdown immediately disrupted 
the routine behaviour of billions of people globally by 
suddenly forcing them to stay indoors and, in many 
cases, work at home. In order to pass their time many 
took to their computer devices for leisure and pleasure 
and to communicate with others. Very often, work-
ers had to use their personal computing equipment 
1 This article is based upon a paper delivered at the CEPOL 
(European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training) Annual 
Research Conference, Featured Presentation 16.00, 5 May 
2021. https://conference.cepol.europa.eu/cepol-online-confer-
ence-2021/talk/DBR7WE/
along with varying levels of personal security and risk 
awareness. These changes in routine behaviour were 
not lost on criminals who quickly adapted in order to 
defraud individuals and organisations or gain access to 
their networks to inflict more cybercrime. While there 
were no new patterns of cybercrime victimisation, oth-
er than pandemic specific scams, there was, however, 
a visible change in cybercrime attack vectors which ac-
celerated the exposure of new pandemic related vul-
nerabilities and increased the overall scale and impact 
of cybercrime. These changes are best demonstrated 
by the case of ransomware, which seeks to encrypt the 
victim’s data and de-encrypt it once a ransom payment 
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has been made. Through a gradual process of evolu-
tion, ransomware has effectively become a sophisticat-
ed billion-dollar business and ransomware actors are 
now supported and facilitated, by a ‘professional’ eco-
system that is incentivised by the high crime yield. Not 
only does this high yield provide serious future career 
alternatives for hackers during a time when job market 
security is uncertain, but it also introduces serious new 
challenges for law and enforcement as well as hinder-
ing economic recovery from the lockdown.
The first part of this article looks at how lockdown dis-
rupted routine behaviours and changed cybercrime 
attack vectors. The second part explores the evolution 
of ransomware tactics to show how changes in cyber-
crime have accelerated because of lockdown. The third 
part shows how cybercrime actors are now support-
ed by a ‘professional’ ecosystem incentivised by the 
high yield which facilitates modern cybercrime. Before 
concluding, the fourth part will briefly outline some 
of the new challenges that modern cybercrimes are 
posing for law makers and law enforcement, not least 
the need to focus different resources upon the various 
stages of the ransomware attack so that they can more 
effectively respond co-productively with cybersecurity 
stakeholders.
1. Lockdown and the disruption of 
routine behaviours
Different national announcements of lockdown took 
place over a period of weeks in March 2020 (see BBC, 
2020)2. As indicated above, the public were forced to 
stay indoors to prevent the spread of the virus and 
many took to their computers to pass the time, but very 
often used those same computers to also work from 
home. To illustrate the disruption of routine behaviours 
Pornhub, a site which enables pornographic materials 
to be uploaded and accessed by users, revealed in 
their ‘insights’ section3 the changes in access to their 
web sites worldwide. Figure 1 plots these reworked 
access statistics to show the changes on three dates 
where various countries decided to lockdown (March 
2 This paper focusses upon the initial 2020 Q1 lockdown which 
occurred very quickly and caused the most disruption to estab-
lished behaviours and practices. Adaptation to the change pre-
pared the public and organisations for subsequent lockdowns 
and did not have such as sudden impact upon behaviours as 
Figure 2 indicates. 
3 N.B. URL not supplied. I am grateful to Pornhub insights for sup-
plying these statistics. Italy, Spain, Russia, UK, Australia chosen 
because of lockdown dates to visualise its impact. 
11, March 14, and March 23). The data show large spikes 
in access, which indicate marked changes in user’s on-
line behaviour and activities and also changes in their 
perceptions of risk, accepting more risk, either for gain 
or excitement or both, although not discussed here 
further, see the application of Katz’s ‘sneaky thrills’ to 
cybercrime in Goldsmith & Wall (2019).
Pornographic videos and other accessed materials4 
are known vehicles for carrying malicious advertising 
(malvertising), malware (malicious software) or links 
to droppers which can launch botnets, trojans or ran-
somware and lead to further victimisations (Dashevsky, 
2017). Please note, however, that this is not to suggest 
that pornographic materials are the only means of 
delivering malicious software. Computer Gaming, for 
example, is also known for making users vulnerable 
to victimisation. The key point here is that computer 
devices mainly used for leisure purposes were, after 
lockdown, often the same computers that were also 
used for working at home. Because of this many or-
ganisations were caught unawares and were forced 
to quickly improvise to improve their safety, although 
some were clearly not quick enough.
Changing cybercrime attack vectors
The increase in vulnerabilities arising from using per-
sonal computers for work and also any changes in per-
ceptions of risk arising from working in an unsupervised 
setting did not go unnoticed by cyber offenders. Adap-
tive offenders exploited the new situation by, on the 
one hand, mounting arrange of COVID related scams 
and frauds, such as fake PPE materials, fake COVID med-
ication through to fake COVID inoculation certificates 
and also Tax refund scams (Action Fraud, 2020). On 
the other hand, the changed situation also provoked 
an expansion in phishing expeditions, which send out 
provocative emails designed to ‘engage’ a public with 
more time on its hands. Phishers, who usually send 
spams out on behalf of clients (scammers or engag-
ers5) as-a-service, deliberately “use human cognitive 
and behavioural attributes to design phishing attacks 
and to trick their victims into taking desired actions” 
(Abroshan et al., 2021). Using the COVID pretext, spam 
emails either sought to directly scam recipients, usual-
4 This is meant as a statement of a general change in behaviour 
across the field and does not suggest that Pornhub specifically 
would be prone to these malicious downloads. 
5 I am differentiating here between scammers who seek to trick 
recipients into parting with money and engagers who seek 
essential information about recipients to use against them in 
the future. 
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ly putting a COVID twist on the everyday scam emails 
(NCSC, 2020), or they sought to ‘engage’ recipients in 
other ways, if only to get them to respond. Sometimes 
simply by provoking recipients to elicit a rude response 
from them. In the latter case any response provides the 
engager with basic information that the email account 
is active and often some basic contact details also if the 
responder includes their signature. This information is 
particularly useful if the signature relates to the recipi-
ent’s workplace as it indicates to the engager that the 
responder could be further pursued and provoked into 
providing more information that could be used to gain 
access to their work organisation6.
The outcome of these phishing ‘engagements’ is that, 
on top of already existing low-level cybercrimes (bulk 
scams and minor hacks etc.), there was also an increase 
in higher-level keystone cybercrimes such as data 
theft, DDoS attacks, ransomware and cryptocrimes 
(and more). IBM found that ransomware and data theft 
6 See further Abroshan et al., (2021) for their useful discussion on 
the act of phishing.
were in the top three cyberthreats, with data theft hav-
ing increased by 160% since 2019 (IBM, 2021: 7). They 
are called Keystone cybercrimes here because they 
support further cybercrimes. Data theft, for example, 
is an essential part of most modern cybercrimes and 
can be sold in dark markets (Hutchings & Holt, 2015) 
and used to launch low level cybercrimes (see further 
the discussion over cybercrime cascades in Porcedda 
& Wall, 2019; 2021).
There has also been a noticeable change in offender 
tactics, accelerated by the COVID lockdown vulner-
abilities identified earlier, from attacking individuals 
towards attacking organisations - which are much 
more lucrative targets than individuals. Importantly, 
lower-level ransomware attacks on individuals appear 
to remain much as before, but what the data and cy-
bersecurity literature indicates that either new sets of 
criminal actors have entered the field or existing actors 
have escalated their ambitions (see for example Accen-
ture, 2021).
Figure 1 Disruption to normal flows of online behaviour: Access to Pornhub before and after the COVID-19 lockdown in 
2020 – source: reworked Pornhub Insights Data ©David S. Wall 2021
4
European Law Enforcement Research Bulletin - Special Conference Edition Nr. 5
In order to commit a cybercrime, offenders are increas-
ingly using more blended tactics that combine more 
social action with scientific tactics. Encryption plus data 
exfiltration and naming and shaming victims, as well as 
using DDoS attacks create even more fear of business 
disruption and compliance (Abrams, 2021a). On the 
technical side, ransomware operators have also begun 
using affiliate business models in their crimeware-as-
a-service market to distribute malware to victims (see 
Kivilevich, 2020). On the social side they are also using 
human-operators to infiltrate networks (explained lat-
er). Offenders are themselves using various facilitators 
or brokers to help them facilitate their crimes which 
constitute the cybercrime ecosystem. Finally, there has 
been a noticeable shift towards ransomware operators 
designing ephemeral business models around their 
cybercrime operations which plan-in a sudden obso-
lescence to frustrate law enforcement efforts (Connolly 
& Wall, 2019).
The effect of changing cybercrime attack vectors
The effects of changing cybercrime attack vectors 
are manyfold, to the point that they are now a serious 
threat to global economies and the post COVID eco-
nomic revival. On the one hand the financial impact is 
crudely measured in billions of dollars. Emsisoft (2021) 
examined the impact on 10 western countries and esti-
mated that $18 billion was paid in ransoms in 2020 and 
that the overall cost of repairing damage could be as 
much as $80 billion (Emsisoft, 2021). On the other hand, 
the financial impact is a direct result of the increase in 
the scalability and overall impact of cybercrime activ-
ities which is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 which both 
show the sudden rise in Q2 2020 in the overall volume 
of attacks (against an already rising trendline) as these 
tactics become effective. The decline in Q4 2020 and 
Q1 2021 is due to various ransomware gangs, such as 
MAZE, stopping their practice. The rise in Q2 2020 is 
partly due to them rebranding and relaunching, but 
also could be related to lockdowns during the second 
or third wave of COVID.
Figure 2: Increase in attacks multiple service victims 2019-2021 (with trendlines) N.B. Q3* 2021 is estimated from 1 
month of data (Source: Main EMPHASIS RWDb n=4500+, ©David S. Wall 2021
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The high incidence of ransom payment, as indicated 
above in the Emsisoft (2021) research, is a major incen-
tive to offenders. This figure is driven by the increased 
use of cyber-insurance by victims. Whilst cyber-insur-
ance does help them recover from attacks, the insur-
ance companies’ tactic of tending to pay the ransom to 
get the business operating again as soon as possible is 
controversial as it inadvertently fuels the crime (Scrox-
ton, 2021).
The growth in the economic yield from cybercrime not 
only increases the criminal appetite and encourages 
more cybercrime, especially the keystone cybercrimes 
which harvest data for use in further crime. As men-
tioned in the introduction, the high yield combined 
with the demands for skills created by the cybercrime 
ecosystem unfortunately provides serious future ca-
reer alternatives and further training for hackers in an 
uncertain job market. Moreover, all these effects create 
serious new challenges for law and enforcement, mak-
ing it harder to police.
2. The evolution of cybercrime 
demonstrated by the development of 
ransomware from RWv.1 to RWv.2 to 
RWv.3
Lockdown provided a fertile environment for acceler-
ating trends in cybercrime that were already starting 
to take place and ransomware is a useful case study 
of a modern cybercrime which can illustrate this. The 
following findings are drawn from two EPSRC funded 
research projects into ransomware (EMPHASIS) and Cy-
bercrime in the Cloud (CRITiCaL) and also informed by 
analysis of an open-source database of over 4500+ ran-
somware attacks compiled for these projects between 
2011 and today7.
Ransomware has always been a blended cybercrime as 
it comprises more than one crime, a computer misuse of-
fence, and a crime of extortion, but the distribution of 
the blend has changed overtime as it has evolved. Fig-
ure 3 indicates three approximate phases of the evolu-
tion of ransomware which are related to the balance of 
7 N.B. There is a long list of caveats with regard to the ransomware 
data that will be explained in future publications, it is open 
source, mainly gathered by keyword searches. Since 2018/19 
the attackers have changed the nature of their attacks and also 
(since 2019) publicly named victims. This information has leaked 
out to the public by journalists writing in the public interest, 
but is itself controversial as it arguably adds another layer of 
victimisation (see Brian Kreb’s 2021 article). 
misuse and extortion and the ways it is organised and 
delivered.
In the RWv.1 era (approx. 2011-2018)8, the main modus 
operandi was to send out ransomware as an attach-
ment in a phishing expedition (spamming) and to use 
the text of the message to get the recipient to open 
the email and respond. When responded to, the at-
tachment or link, infected the recipient’s computer 
causing them to pay the ransom to obtain a decryptor. 
These were fairly unsophisticated low-yield operations 
which relied on bulk-victimisation.
The RWv.2 era, in contrast (2018-2021), stepped up at-
tacks on businesses away from individuals, and from 
late 2019, introduced additional social and business 
pressures into the mix. Not only did the attackers steal 
essential data before encryption but they also named 
and shamed businesses via their web sites. Both, to 
force victims into paying the ransom.
The RWv.3 era began to creep in from late 2019 to over-
take RWv.2. Using similar tactics on businesses to those 
in RW v.2, RWv.3 combines these with additional higher 
order hacking skills to enter networks and move lateral-
ly across them to make the attack more effective. Some 
attacks are also ‘human operated’ rather than use the 
‘spray and prey’ (attack everybody and see who falls 
victim) approach. In addition, RWv.3 offenders increase 
the scalability of their attacks by tending to attack 
multiple service providers and their supply chains to 
make secondary victims of the primary victim’s clients 
and increase their pain enough to pay the ransom. 
Collectively, these actions increased the overall scale 
of attacks. What was a simple automated crime has 
become industrialised, for want of a better expression, 
by combining more science related skills with more in-
tense social actions ranging from socially engineering 
victims into responding and also human-operated ran-
somware.
There are two important aspects of a ransomware at-
tack a) getting into the system (infiltration) and attack-
ing it b) and (exfiltration) stealing key data and getting 
victims to pay the ransom by creating fear and further-
ing their pain.
8 N.B. The dates are approximate. This describes the crypto-ran-
somware era and please note that there were pre-crypto 
ransomware eras (see further Connolly & Wall, 2019).
6
European Law Enforcement Research Bulletin - Special Conference Edition Nr. 5
Infiltrating networks
As ransomware operators moved from RW1 to RW2 there 
was a noticeable shift in infiltration tactics away from ‘spray 
and prey’ tactics in phishing practices towards big game 
hunting. Big game hunting is a targeted phishing attack de-
liberately designed to ensnare specific groups. In the case 
of ransomware attacks, the focus is upon key managers in 
organisations who have access to the business network and 
often have higher user privileges. Big game hunting was 
accelerated by exploiting lockdown disruption and insecure 
work-from-home systems. Once in an organisation, hackers 
move laterally to find key data to steal and plant the encryp-
tion process. They may be in a network for anything from 
two weeks to over a year (Ilascu, 2020).
Attackers seem to activate the encryption process at vul-
nerable times for an organisation, especially at the start 
of public holidays when staffing tends to be at its lowest 
(Connolly & Wall, 2019; 10). The evidence is that ransom-
ware gangs are increasingly attacking managed service 
providers and cloud-based-services, as described in 
RWv.3. Here, one attack hits between seven to ten of 
the victim’s client organisations and their supply chains, 
and scales up the impact of the attack. In some cases, 
tens if not hundreds of secondary victims were involved 
also resulting in class actions and fines from information 
commissioners, which intensifies the pressure on the pri-
mary victim to resolve the situation quickly (Gatlan, 2020). 
The statistics and trendlines in Figure 2 & 3 show how 
attacks on multiple service organisations have markedly 
increased since mid-2019 as RWv.3 developed traction.
One rather surprising finding from the analysis of the 
data was that ransomware gangs tend to target SMEs 
(small & medium sized enterprises) ($2m-$10m-10-50 
staff & $10m-$50m-50-250 staff) rather than very large 
business (see Figure 4). One reason for this may be 
that the cybersecurity of SMEs is less sophisticated, 
yet they can still afford cyber-insurance or to directly 
pay a relatively large ransom (see Figure 4). Very often 
these victims are part of a supply chain, so their own 
victimisation also impacts upon their clients. Repeat 
victimisation is becoming a new feature of ransom-
ware following an increase in double attacks. This is 
either because the ‘initial access brokers’, who gain ac-
cess to networks and then sell the access credentials 
to ransomware gangs sometimes install additional 
backdoors and also sell the details of these unpatched 
vulnerabilities to other ransomware groups (De Blasi, 
2021). Or, sometimes ransomware attackers (affiliates) 
will use two types of ransomware, layering them on 
top of each other to ‘net them the most money for the 
least amount of effort’ (Callow cited by Newman, 2021).
Figure 3: The evolution of ransomware that increase the scalability of attacks (Source: Main EMPHASIS RWDb n=4500+, 
©David S. Wall 2021
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Exfiltration
Once the encryption process has taken place, the ran-
somware gangs seek to make victims pay the ransom by 
disrupting their business flow. New tactics are constantly 
being employed to increase victims’ fear and discom-
fort. They do this by naming the victims on their own 
‘leak’ sites, often publishing an example of confidential 
business information, sometimes including trade secrets 
exfiltrated. The ransom note usually states that if the ran-
som is not paid in cryptocurrency by a specific deadline, 
then further portions of the stolen data will be published 
on the leak site. To make their operations more effective 
and compete successfully in a competitive market for 
victims some ransomware operators such as MAZE have 
formed cartels, in which they shared resources (for a fee) 
such as their leak websites where they publicly humiliate 
victim organisations in to paying the ransom demand9.
A further threat was to publicly auction off the stolen 
data if the ransom is not paid10. Others levy two ran-
soms, the first is for the decryption key and the sec-
9 The MAZE group which ceased in late October 2020, affiliated 
various other ransomware gangs (Lockbit, Suncrypt, Rag-
narLocker) although they and also analysts have since stated 
that the MAZE cartel was not actually a cartel (DiMaggio, 2021).
10 One group (RagnarLocker) even took out Facebook ads to 
further shame their victims (Bracken, 2020), and some Ransom-
ware groups now include DDoS attacks during demand period 
(Abrams, 2021).
ond to delete the copied data so that if cannot be re-
used (Krebs, 2020). Because of the central importance 
of data in a ransomware attack, ransomware attacks 
should now be regarded as major data theft incidents, 
plus officially reported data losses helps the statistics. 
The next stage of ransomware Rv.4 will probably be 
characterised by data becoming the key focus of ran-
somware as it develops into data extortion (Acronis, 
2020) and/or by statecraft and the deliberate targeting 
of specific infrastructures (NCST, 2021).
Figure 5 shows the major ransomware groups/ gangs 
currently operating or have operated since 2019 (those 
presently dormant are prefixed with a * - which could 
quickly change as they rebrand). Fig. 5 illustrates both 
the number of victimisations and also the volume of 
specific ransomware gang operations. Importantly, the 
number of victimisations is not an indication of their 
success. Some of the groups with smaller numbers of 
victims are primarily ‘human operated’ and focus upon 
infiltrating the larger organisations and have, as such, 
a much higher rate of victimisation to ransom pay-
ment.
Figure 4 Ransomware type by Organisational size – Data snapshot of the top 8 ransomware groups, June-Oct 2020 
n=500 cases (Source: N&S RWDB, ©David S. Wall 2021)
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3. Support from a transnational organised 
‘professional’ ecosystem
A deeper look at the infiltration and exfiltration of 
a ransomware attack process reveals nine distinct stages 
which each require the application of different special-
ised skill sets to make them successful. These stages 
illustrate how the attack process has become more 
specialised and even professionalised as ransomware 
has developed. The analysis also clearly illustrates that 
each stage is developing its own practices alongside 
detailed skill sets and tailored organisational forms and 
bespoke business models to make the services avail-
able to clients. This specialisation steps up scalability. 
In theory, an individual (the lone operator or single 
empowered agent - Pease, 2001) could carry out each 
of the functions needed to perform each stage of the 
attack such as phishing for credentials, exploiting vul-
nerabilities, infiltrating and exfiltrating and then mon-
etizing the crime. The problem for the lone offender, 
however, is that these processes are not only laborious 
and time consuming, but the yield is low, and the risk 
of capture is high. In order to make cybercrime pay and 
turn it from a hobby to a career choice, primary offend-
ers need to outsource some of the basic functions of 
the crime to organised specialists with highly devel-
oped skills sets and organisations in order to increase 
their crime yield and lower their risk of capture. Figure 
6 shows this transition from hobby to career criminal.
The following nine stages of ransomware are ideal 
types as the organisation of ransomware groups can 
vary considerably, but this model identifies both the 
component stages and also the key skill sets needed 
to carry it out.
1. Reconnaissance of potential victims and identification 
of access points to networks.
Knowledge is gathered about whether a vulnerability 
such as a zero-day exploit can be applied to a particu-
lar organisation’s network. This information is often 
identified by a specialist who compiles it and sells it to 
other offenders, for example, an ‘initial access broker’ 
via one of the forums or dark market sites.
2. Gaining ‘initial access’ to the victim’s network.
The application of the vulnerabilities in stage 1 is often 
applied by an ‘initial access broker’, who is either com-
missioned to gain access, or sells on the access creden-
tials directly via a forum or dark market site. If the latter, 
this data may be bought by an affiliate of a ransom-
ware group who is trusted by the operators to use their 
ransomware for a fee.
Figure 5 The most prevalent Ransomware gangs in terms of organisational victimisation - Jan 2019 - May 2021 
(2676 Orgs - 32 Groups (with over 4 victims) - source EMPHASIS/CONTRAILS Main RW Db). © David S. Wall 2021
N.B. * denotes not functioning at time of writing in May 2021.
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3. Escalating computing access privileges in the system.
Once in a victim’s network the ‘affiliate’ will seek to in-
crease their user privileges and move laterally across it. 
As with information gained from earlier stages, these 
advanced credentials may also be sold on or devel-
oped by the attacker (the affiliate).
4. Identifying key organisational data that will cause 
most pain when taken.
During the process of lateral movement, the affiliate 
will seek out the victims most precious data, especially 
as commercially sensitive business data in the form of 
personal details of employees, suppliers, or clients.
5. Exfiltrating the key data and installing ransomware.
Attackers will copy the data and exfiltrate it before set-
ting in place the brand of ransomware to which they 
are affiliated. Once exfiltration is completed, they will 
plan the activation of the encryption process, usually 
when the organisation is at its most vulnerable, for ex-
ample at the beginning of a holiday period (Connolly 
& Wall, 2019; 10).
6. Naming and shaming victims & levying the ransom 
demand.
Once encryption has been activated, affiliates will use 
the ransomware brand’s specific leak web site to name 
and shame the victim. Initially they will make public, 
evidence of the attack, then portions of the data if 
the payment deadlines are not met. After encryption, 
some ransomware groups also bombard their victims 
with DDoS attacks to hinder attempts to restore func-
tionality to their systems. Other groups also use other 
media, such as Facebook advertisements (RagnarLock-
er).
7. Payment of the ransom demand in cryptocurrency.
Ransom payment amounts in cryptocurrency will have 
been set by a ‘ransomware consultant’ who based 
them on the victim’s worth as estimated from infor-
mation gathered during infiltration and lateral move-
ment across the victim’s network. Victims are usually 
given precise instructions by their attackers about their 
attack and how to pay the ransom, often including 
a third-party call centre hired to assist victims buying 
cryptocurrency to make the payments.
8. Monetarising the crime.
Once the ransom has been paid, it has to be convert-
ed from cryptocurrency into fiat (government-issued) 
money. To assist with this, the attackers hire in the 
services of monetisers who will launder the cryptocur-
rency via various means (including an army of money 
mules) to turn it into untraceable cash.
Figure 6: From hobby to career cybercrime © David S. Wall 2021
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9. Post-crime “getting away” with it.
Once the attackers have received their fiat money, they 
then have to invest it in such a way that it avoids the 
banks’ suspicious transactions radar. Post-crime is pos-
sibly the stage which carries most risk for the offender. 
For this purpose, a different set of financial advice will 
be sought which locates the crime gains in the legiti-
mate economy.
This brief summary of the stages of a ransomware at-
tack suggests that the key attackers (usually affiliates of 
the operators) are not usually involved in all of the main 
stages of the attack and facilitate the attacks by either 
hiring in a range of skill sets, or outsourcing services, or 
buy access information (or all three). Identifying these 
specific stages is useful for the discussion over policing 
ransomware because they suggest and profile some 
‘pinch’ points where law enforcement and cyberse-
curity could focus resources in order to interrupt the 
ransomware victimisation cycle. Importantly, they also 
suggest some useful principles for understanding the 
structure of the organisation of cybercrime.
The emergence of the cybercrime ecosystem
The success of ransomware has led to the creation of 
a cybercrime ecosystem. New forms of online organ-
ised crime groups are emerging to commercially deliv-
er key skill sets and services to those wanting to launch 
ransomware attacks. Importantly, these organisational 
forms tend to be flat ephemeral structures, often with 
planned-in obsolescence. They are not hierarchical 
and sustained (like Mafias), in fact they are relatively 
disorganised by comparison.
The Cybercrime Ecosystem (see Figure 7) enables the 
various cybercrimes to be carried out more effectively 
whilst minimising risk and maximising the return to the 
offenders. It gives offenders without skill sets access 
to those who have them and the organisation to car-
ry them out. The skill levels and resources required to 
launch such attacks are now much higher and greater 
than the lone operator - the single empowered agent - 
could ever muster. The modern ransomware process, 
in effect, symbolises the industrialisation of cyber-
crime. Functions that were once performed by an in-
dividual are now performed by other more specialised 
and skilled individuals who are highly organised, even 
though this may be in a distributed, rather than hierar-
chical manner of the traditional organisation (Musotto 
& Wall, 2019). What is clear from the ransomware time-
lines illustrated earlier in Figures 2 & 3 is the upscale in 
both the volume and also the impact of the attacks. 
This upscale is the product of rationalisation (whether 
intentional or not) within the organisation of cyber-
crime and also changes in tactics to adapt to changing 
markets for victims for which offender groups fiercely 
compete. Recall, the shift outlined earlier, in targeting 
attacks from individuals towards organisations and lat-
terly to Multiple Service Organisations (MSOs) which 
provide services for other organisations. On average 
a victimised MSO affects 10+ client organisations and 
in turn their thousands or even millions of their clients11.
Ransomware as a service
Central to the cybercrime ecosystem as it applies to 
ransomware is the emergence of Ransomware as a ser-
vice (RaaS) in which operators rent out their ransom-
ware to attackers (as affiliates) for a fee or a percentage 
of the ransom. Some RaaS is open to anybody who will 
pay, other RaaS is closed and operators will only accept 
known and trusted individuals as affiliates in return for 
a percentage of the ransom (Coveware, 2021). There is 
also a division between ‘spray and pray’ and human 
operated RaaS which, respectively, map on to the 
‘open’ and ‘closed’ models. The former is usually bulk 
delivered by phishing (spammed) emails which trick 
(socially engineer) victims into opening an attachment 
or URL link so as to infect their computer. The latter is 
operated by individuals who infiltrate networks and 
manipulate their way around them, rather like a virtual 
burglar.
Melandab and colleagues researched the sale of RaaS 
on popular web forums and dark markets prior to Q4 
2019. They found that the impact of the earlier ‘open’ 
RaaS was much more limited than was often declared 
in the cybersecurity media (Melandab et al., 2020). 
They also found that ransomware becomes a serious 
threat when committed by experienced professional 
cybercriminals who use darknet forums as a recruit-
ment ground for their operations. Both Melandab et 
al. (2020), Coveware, (2021) and other commentators 
have found that the ransomware operators, who own 
and operate the malware are different actors to the 
affiliates who rent the ransomware to use it to attack. 
So, ransomware operators not only spread their risk, ef-
fectively hiding behind affiliates, but they also plan ob-
solescence into their business model. Groups such as 
MAZE, NEMTY and various others abruptly ceased op-
erations when they were most successful and cashed 
11 A calculation based upon the EMPHASIS research. 
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out without giving any warning and abandoned an-
ything left, thus leaving little trail to follow. Some op-
erators, such as SHADE left the field and even posted 
decryption keys when they shut down (Abrams, 2020).
Further conceptualisation of the Cybercrime 
Ecosystem
The emergence of a cybercrime ecosystem to help fa-
cilitate all aspects of cybercrime is key to understand-
ing the increase in cybercrime victimisation. Aspects of 
this ecosystem were illustrated earlier in the nine-stage 
analysis of a ransomware attack. At each stage various 
services, information or data are required to organise 
and facilitate the crime and enact it. There are eight key 
services that are required to achieve this.
• Databrokers trade in stolen datasets, potential victim 
profiles and also provide access to illegal data stream-
ing. This data can be used in different ways by different 
offender groups in both the formation and the delivery 
of the services.
• Crimeware-as-a-service (CaaS) operators may develop and 
hire out, for example, Ransomware-as-a-service, DDoS 
(Stressers) or other malware (e.g., Zeus banking trojans). 
CaaS may also include spammers who hire out spam-
ware-as-a-service for phishers, scammers and fraudsters, 
and bot-herders who rent out command and control 
botnets (robot networks) which send out emails in mass 
volumes. Often these services are automated via a dash-
board for buyers to buy a specific service, choosing the 
size and type of attack and also the victim group which 
itself is the product of acquired data. Very often CaaS 
brokers will market their services with trial offers and run 
them as subscription services (see Musotto & Wall, 2020).
• The Darkmarketeers provide, sell, or trade services, usual-
ly via the ToR network (Onion Router) and notable dark 
markets have included Silk Road 1 & 2, Dream Market etc.
• Bullet Proof Hosters, as the title indicates, run ‘Bullet Proof’ 
hosting services that provide ‘protected’ networked 
services that for a price allow unrestricted content to 
be uploaded and disseminated. Such services could be 
used, for example, to host dark markets or a ransomware 
victim leak www site. They effectively reduce client risk 
and protect clients from being caught, which is covered 
by the premium paid for the service.
• Monetisers organise and manage a financial return to the 
attackers by laundering cryptocurrency and turning it 
into fiat currency (for a fee).
• Bug (Crime IT) Brokers support the various Crimeware as 
a Service by writing and selling code and vulnerabili-
ties12, also solving any additional coding problems at-
tackers may have.
• The Infiltration brokers are ‘Engagers’ who ‘engage’ with 
victims via their responses to phishing and obtain cre-
dentials and sell or pass this information on to ‘Initial Ac-
cess Brokers’ who gain entry and sell the access details.
• The final group are Negotiators who negotiate the 
amount of the ransom payment. They comprise of ‘Ran-
somware Consultants’ on the offender side (Gemini, 
2021) and ‘Negotiators’ on behalf of the victim. Both are 
crucial to ransomware operation (Murphy, 2021).
The services are not arranged in Figure 7 in any par-
ticular order because there is no set order, however, 
together they form the cybercriminal ecosystem that 
enables ransomware and, more specifically, modern 
cybercrime more generally.
These roles are in a constant state of flux as both tech-
nologies and crime practices evolve. They ‘automate’ 
roles once performed by lone offenders and help the 
attacker (primary offender) to reach the scalability and 
volume of crime needed to achieve a sizable return for 
their investment. Buying in a particular service from 
the cybercrime ecosystem not only saves the offender 
time but can also offset liability. Each service tends to 
be run by one or more kingpins in the more traditional 
organised crime parlance. They frequently recruit affili-
ates to distribute their service, usually for a percentage 
of the profit or a flat fee. In effect, this is the new face 
of transnational organised crime. It is distributed rather 
than hierarchical and appears disorganised by compar-
ison.
4. The new challenges of cybercrime for law and 
enforcement
The developments described above are generating 
new challenges for law and its enforcement. They are 
also burdening policing services that are themselves 
struggling to maintain their own level of service during 
periods of lockdowns. One of the main challenges is 
that ransomware is a blended cybercrime, in fact, a col-
lection of cybercrimes that once stood on their own 
and hard to conceptualise in law. In the UK ransom-
ware is both a computer misuse crime and also a crime 
of extortion (and various other offences relating to 
phishing and the theft and abuse of personal informa-
tion and even money laundering) - very different types 
12 This is part of the research completed for the CRITiCAL project 
and is forthcoming. An early outline is found in a paper ‘Cyber-
crime Kingpins’ delivered at the American Society of Criminolo-
gy in San Francisco on 14 Nov. 2019.
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of offending. Each component also falls under differ-
ent bodies of law which not only makes ransomware 
statistically problematic and hard to record, because 
in the UK the ‘ransom’ and the ‘ware’ can be record-
ed in either the computer misuse or economic crime 
statistics. But it also means that the responsibility for 
policing them (technically) fall under different policing 
agencies13. Agencies, which often have untrusted rela-
tionships with industry, especially when victims pay the 
ransom because they do not want their victimisation 
to become public for commercial reasons and want to 
resolve the matter quickly and privately – which leads 
to under-reporting. Even though the data exfiltration 
tactic has made ransomware a data breach issue which 
has led to naming the breaches being considered as 
fair game for many journalists and commentators. This 
conflict between the public and private interest hin-
ders the search for justice and is one area then needs 
to be resolved if intelligence and data is to be shared to 
resolve this common problem.
13 Different UK police forces can separately carry responsibilities 
for cybercrime and economic crimes. Overlying this, the Nation-
al Crime Agency can carry responsibilities for offences which 
span arrange of regions. In practice, these differences are largely 
resolved by the Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCU) which 
interface the different agencies involved.
Because ransomware is under-reported, it is therefore 
under-prosecuted, which means little court experi-
ence across the criminal justice system. Its transnation-
al nature is also problematic as many attack groups 
deliberately seek victims in other jurisdictions due to 
cumbersome cross-border legal and policing rules. 
The final problem for policing is that ransomware may 
be big globally, but is small locally, so local police get 
little experience of dealing with the crime. The UK 
ROCU (Regional Organised Crime Unit) model, howev-
er, connects local and national police forces regionally 
and it is fairly well regarded by police officers and also 
respected by industry (see Connolly & Wall, 2019).
Yet, despite these systemic hurdles, there have been 
a number of significant policing successes. The trans-
national interdisciplinary and cross-sector ‘No More 
Ransomware’ project has broadly been successful in 
galvanising 170 partners from the public and private 
sector. Its decryptors “have helped more than six mil-
lion people to recover their files for free”, allegedly sav-
ing at least €1billion in ransomware payments (Gatlan, 
2021). There have also been a number of examples of 
cross sector interventions which have resulted in law 
enforcement taking down botnets that distribute ran-
somware across the networks prior to attacks (e.g., 
TrickBot in Oct 2020, Emotet in Jan 2021). Also, taken 
Figure 7: The Cybercrime Ecosystem
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down have been bullet proof hosting services such as 
Maxided (Osborne, 2018) which hosted now defunct 
cryptomarkets such as Silk Road, Hansa etc. Further-
more, there have also been significant arrests of ran-
somware operators, for example, in July 2020 in Belarus 
the operators of GandCrab (RaaS) ransomware opera-
tors which ran between Jan 2018 and Mid-2019 were 
arrested. This was followed by the arrest of a GandCr-
ab affiliate in March 2021 in South Korea. Furthermore, 
members of the Egregor (RaaS) ransomware group 
which ran between Sept. 2020 and Feb 2021 and which 
allegedly comprised of members of the MAZE group, 
were arrested in the Ukraine in Feb 2021 (Abrams, 
2021b). Also helping the policing mission have been 
the ransomware groups by hindering each other’s op-
erations14, which could either indicate the strength of 
competition between the various ransomware opera-
tors illustrated earlier or it could simply be sour grapes 
by rivals (Schwartz, 2021).
The main challenges for police forces lie in working out 
who the actual offenders are in complex cybercrimes 
like ransomware and to be able to apply the relevant 
bodies of law to prosecute them, especially as the or-
ganisation of the crime is so distributed and there are 
a number of different actors involved.
Conclusions
Rather than generate new cybercrime opportunities, 
the COVID-19 lockdown has led to the acceleration 
of cybercrime trends that were already in play. In this 
sense, the lockdown was not transformative for cyber-
crime, but it was an important enabler. Highly adaptive 
offender groups took advantage of new opportunities 
presented by the lockdown disruptions, as they so 
often tend to do. What these lockdown-accelerated 
trends have done is to illustrate that ransomware is not 
only a major form of modern transnational organised 
crime, but it has become a multi-billion-dollar indus-
try which keeps on growing and will continue to grow 
(Ilascu, 2021). It is also changing the way that criminals 
organise themselves online. Modern cyber-offenders 
appear to be following a business manual rather than 
an organised crime playbook. The complex and spe-
cialised organisation of ransomware and other major 
14 The REvil (Sodinokibi) ransomware gang, for example, claimed 
to have identified the real identities of the persons behind the 
MAZE service, their rival, stating that they have direct con-
nections with the Russian Government and comprise of eight 
individuals who are involved with the Russian FSB.
cybercrimes is not only developing a professional eco-
system to enable and support it, but it is also providing 
offenders with alternative career choices.
If ransomware is an example of cybercrime as industry, 
because its evolution bears the hallmarks of industrial-
isation, then it also creates a perfect storm for law en-
forcement by introducing a number of contradictions 
that frustrate its prevention, mitigation, and investiga-
tion. Central to the discussion over the policing (inves-
tigation), mitigation and prevention of ransomware is 
a decades-old divide between the public interest and 
the private interests. Even after three decades of cy-
bercrime, it is still the case that whilst the various par-
ties involved in policing cybercrime still all agree on 
the problem and end goal, they still disagree about 
how to achieve them. As a consequence, the various 
stakeholders, at a broader level, rarely work together 
and share data as they need to do if they are going to 
co-own the problem and work together to co-produce 
a solution by sharing data and expertise. At a more ba-
sic level, however, one way of beginning this process is 
to break down the attack process into the various stag-
es and focus upon these in order to stop the attack. 
This includes also focusing upon the various compo-
nents of the cybercrime ecosystem.
Recognising the different stages of the attacks will 
enable law enforcement and cybersecurity to more 
effectively apply the right skill sets and marshal the key 
agencies involved to achieve the correct and most ef-
fective and appropriate level of Policing. This analysis 
will hopefully augment some of the bigger govern-
mental programmes that have been announced this 
past year, such as the multi-skilled and multi-agency 
Ransomware Task Force (IST, 2021). Also, the continu-
ation of the anti-ransomware initiatives such as no 
more ransom.org. To paraphrase the World Economic 
Forum, cybercrime is much bigger than governments 
(Mee & Chandrasekhar, 2021). Everyone involved has 
to work together and co-own the problem in order to 
co-produce the solution, words that are easier to say 
than put into practice.
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